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Greece, Portugal and Spain are among the countries worst hit by the 2008 Great Recession, 
with significant electoral and political turmoil since then. However, one of the dimensions in 
which they differ is the presence and varieties of populism in parties’ political proposals. 
Drawing on holistic coding of party manifestos, we assess the varying presence of populist 
features in mainstream and challenging parties before and after the 2008 economic 
downturn. Our empirical findings show that populism is significantly higher in Greece 
compared to Spain and Portugal. We do not find a significant impact of the crisis as the 
degree of populism remains rather stable in Greece and Portugal, while it increases in Spain, 
mainly due to the rise of new populist forces. In addition, inclusionary populism is the 
predominant flavour of populist parties in new Southern Europe, although exclusionary 
populism is present to a lesser extent in the Greek case. Finally, we contend the national 
context - namely the ideological legacy of parties and the strategic options of party 
leadership -, is crucial for explaining cross-country variation in the intensity of populism and 
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Introduction 
As a result of the ‘Great Recession’, mainstream parties have faced electoral setbacks 
and challenger parties have gained growing strength in national party systems. While 
traditional party families (i.e. social democrats, Christian democrats, liberals) are losing 
popular support, a number of populist parties have made inroads into European political 
systems, destabilising usual alignments and patterns of competition. Although scholars 
disagree on the magnitude of the populist earthquake shattering democracies in affluent 
societies and whether the process came to a halt, they tend to acknowledge that, from a 
marginal phenomenon, populist parties have now become a persistent and quite successful 
political actor in Europe.  
The economic and financial crisis has impacted significantly on party system change 
in Southern Europe (Bosco and Verney 2016). Greece, Portugal and Spain, three new South 
European democracies, until recently characterised by stable party systems and centripetal 
dynamics of party competition based on two moderate forces, have experienced increasing 
fragmentation and an opening structure of party competition since the economic crisis 
(Morlino and Raniolo 2017). The emergence and success of new ‘populist’ actors have been 
one key element behind this major shift. Yet, distinct trajectories can be seen, showing 
different patterns of party system change. While in Spain two new parties, one on the left and 
populist, have shattered the two-partyism established in the post-Franco era, in Portugal 
established actors have succeeded in averting the entrance of new political forces, populist or 
otherwise. On the other hand, Greece has experienced a new ‘populist era’ through the 
success of populist parties mainly on the left and less prominently, though still significantly, 
on the right. 
This paper is primarily devoted to examining and explaining variation in the extent 
and type of populism emerging in Greece, Portugal and Spain, in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis. By means of a content analysis of election manifestos using holistic grading 
and a qualitative assessment of populist frames, it aims to contribute to an empirical analysis 
of the spread of populism in new Southern Europe across countries, party types and party 
systems. These three cases have been selected not only because they experienced a similar 
economic and political crisis since 20081, but also because they underwent parallel 
trajectories in terms of democratic consolidation and party system institutionalisation 
(Morlino 1998; Diamandouros and Gunther 2001). How do these countries differ in terms of 
degree of populism? Has the crisis increased the overall level of populism in new Southern 
European countries? And what is the ideological bent of the populist frames adopted by 
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distinct political parties? These are the main research questions that this study aims to 
address. 
Our purpose, we stress at the outset, is not to determine the factors that explain the 
pervasiveness of populism, nor to test whether the crisis caused the emergence or electoral 
success of populist parties (see on this Hawkins et al. 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2017). Addressing such goals would demand a drastic expansion of the cases included in the 
analysis. Our goal here is much more modest, and it consists in the qualitative analysis of 
cross-national and diachronic variations in the levels and content in populist proposals in 
three countries that have shared important political and socioeconomic features over the last 
decades. Although it might be possible to approach our topic using quantitative methods (for 
example through public opinion surveys), we employ qualitative case studies because the 
question of context – namely ideological legacies and party strategies – would appear to be 
crucial for understanding the spreading of the populist phenomenon in new Southern 
European democracies. 
The paper is structured as follows. We address in the next section key theoretical 
issues for the study of populism and lay out our main expectations concerning the emergence 
of populism in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. In the following section we present our empirical 
research strategy and the type of data we analyse. Section four focuses on the political 
background of the three countries and the trajectory of party system during the crisis. We 
discuss our main empirical findings in section five. Finally, we conclude by presenting some 




The European crisis and the emergence of populism: literature review  
 
Cas Mudde’s established minimal definition of populism is that of ‘an ideology that 
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 
‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 2004: 543). Populism 
is deemed a ‘thin centred’ ideology because its core can be combined with other ideologies 
‘thick’ or ‘thin’, such as communism, nationalism, or ecologism (Albertazzi and McDonnell 
2008; Canovan 2004; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). A variation on the understanding of 
populism as a ‘thin ideology’ is populism as a style or discourse of politics, i.e. not 
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expressing core beliefs but a mode of political expression employed strategically by its 
proponents (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). Populism thus seen allows for the study of the 
phenomenon as a ‘gradational property’ rather than as an essential quality of particular 
parties (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013: 7-10, Rooduijn et al. 2014).   
A significant distinction among populisms drawn in the comparative literature is that 
between an egalitarian, inclusionary type, which until recently has been more successful in 
the left movements of Latin America, and a xenophobic, exclusionary type to be found 
mostly in the far-right parties that have developed in Europe since the 1980s (Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). The distinction is analysed on the basis of three dimensions: 
material, political, and symbolic (Filc 2010: 128–38). The material dimension concerns the 
distribution of resources among social groups with inclusionary populist parties in favour of 
mass welfare programmes to include the poor and exclusionary populisms defending forms of 
welfare chauvinism that aims to protect established welfare insiders from immigrant 
outsiders. The political dimension refers to forms of political mobilisation that go beyond 
representative democratic channels such as plebiscitary and local forms of radical democracy. 
Inclusionary populisms mean for these mechanisms to give a voice to disregarded groups 
while exclusionary populisms also advocate similar devices but demand the 
disenfranchisement of immigrant groups. Finally, the symbolic dimension involves setting 
the boundaries of ‘the people’, with inclusionary movements highlighting, for instance, the 
‘dignity’ of indigenous populations, while symbolic exclusion often draws on forms of 
cultural discrimination (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).  
It has been widely argued that economic crises facilitate populism (Stavrakakis 2014; 
Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Moffit 2016). Such events have ‘catalysing effects’ that intensify 
long standing problems (Morlino and Raniolo 2017: 22). Such are the long term trends of 
increasing economic inequality and social exclusion that have accompanied technological 
displacement, deep changes in the world of work and welfare and neoliberal economic 
policies (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 2). Economic crises reinforce the divide between 
globalisation’s ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Kriesi 2014). In addition, the crisis has increased 
political discontent and mistrust towards representative institutions, a situation that seems 
strongly connected to the success of populist parties (Moffit 2015; Rooduijn et al. 2016). This 
is particularly the case of Southern European countries, characterised by a significant 
worsening of different components of democratic legitimacy such as trust in the parliament, 
trust in political parties or satisfaction with democracy (Muro and Vidal 2017). In so doing 
they provide fertile ground for challenger parties to blame national elites and mainstream 
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political parties for the economic and social woes of globalisation’s ‘losers’ (Hobolt and 
Tilley 2016). Higher levels of populism also seem to be more common among parties on the 
left and right extremes of the ideological continuum than among mainstream parties 
(Rooduijn et al. 2014; Polk et al. 2017). 
The key factors that are likely to favour the emergence or predominance of 
inclusionary rather than exclusionary populism in the aftermath of an economic crisis can be 
argued to lie in high levels of crisis intensity, in the retrenchment of welfare states in the face 
of economic crisis (Kriesi and Pappas 2015), and in the lack of partisan programmatic 
responsiveness (Bornschier 2010; Roberts 2013 and 2015). On the other hand, exclusionary 
populism, which is mostly associated to transformations taking place in the cultural and 
symbolic dimensions, is more likely to emerge when the salience of immigration increases 
and mainstream right-wing parties do not politicise or give priority to xenophobic public 
preferences (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). 
New Southern European democracies have provided a fertile environment for the 
emergence of inclusionary populism for two main reasons. On the one hand, the Great 
Recession has brought to the fore materialist concerns, increasing the salience of socio-
economic cleavages (Kriesi 2014: 369-70). On the other, these countries have also 
experienced a strong responsiveness crisis, as socialist parties have adopted neoliberal 
policies that contradicted their founding principles. A number of authors have argued that this 
programmatic dealignment facilitates the emergence of populist contenders of the 
inclusionary type that promise to restore equality and dignity. 
However, the general links between populism and economic crisis are insufficient to 
account for cross-national, cross-partisan, and even cross-time variations in the levels and 
substantive contents of populist appeals in Greece, Portugal and Spain. A comparative 
explanation of such differences must take into consideration national contexts and legacies 
(Taggart 2017), party ideological frames (Moffit 2016; Taggart 2017; Polk et al. 2017), and 
party strategies (Pauwels 2011). In sum, we argue that ideational theory (Hawkins et al. 2017; 
2018) may explain to a great extent the different nuances that the variegated phenomenon of 
populism may take, even within the region most affected by the economic crisis. 
The previous discussion allows us to lay out our main empirical expectations. For the 
reasons we outlined above, and given the intensity of the effects of the Great Recession, we 
expect substantial increases in the populism levels in these three countries after 2008. Now, 
we also expect to find important differences in this regard between Greece and the two 
Iberian countries. The already established prevalence of populist rhetoric elements in the 
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Greek party system (Pappas 2013 and 2014; Vasilopoulou et al. 2014) should also lead to 
substantially higher populism levels in that country than in Portugal and Spain. As for cross-
partisan variations, for strategic reasons we expect populism levels to be higher among 
challenger2 and opposition parties. Such parties will be more inclined to appeal to dissatisfied 
voters by emphasising the unresponsiveness and selfishness of political and ruling elites. 
Although opposition parties are likely to employ more frequently a populist discourse, the 
move to government is expected to downsize the populist component (Heinish 2003). Also at 
the partisan level, ideologically more extreme parties will be more prone to articulate populist 
discourses directed against status quo elites that resist drastic changes in either direction of 
the ideological spectrum. And finally, given the intensity of the economic crisis, the hardship 
of austerity measures, and the centrality of socio-economic cleavages in these three party 
systems, we expect that materially inclusionary, redistributive populism will be the prevalent 
in these cases. However, the fact that anti-immigration appeals were previously activated in 
the Greek political arena (Ellinas 2013) - but not in Portugal (Marchi 2013) or Spain 
(Llamazares 2012) - leads us also to expect the presence of symbolically exclusionary 
components in the populist discourse of some Greek parties.  
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The difficulty of defining conceptually the populist phenomenon mirrors the 
ambiguity in measuring the degree of populism associated to distinct political actors. A 
number of approaches have been used to measure populism. Overall, these strategies rely on 
the ideological conceptualisation of populism (Mudde 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2015) that consists of two main dimensions, namely 1) people centrism and 2) anti-elitism. 
The first dimension aims to measure references to the ‘people’, the ‘popular will’, the 
homogeneity of the people, etc. The second dimension refers to critiques towards political 
elites, conceived as the ‘evil’, a minority that controls key decisions against the interests of 
the people.  
To analyse populist discourse, the most common approach is based on content 
analysis of party documents. The two main variants are based on computerised content 
analysis and human-coded content analysis (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). This paper relies 
on a different approach based on holistic grading of party documents. This technique has 
been developed mainly by Hawkins and his team (Hawkins 2009 and 2013; Hawkins and 
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Castanho Silva 2016, 2018). Basically, it consists of attributing a score to the document 
(election manifesto or speeches) as a whole by looking at the degree of populist discourse. 
The key unit of analysis is the entire election manifesto, not the single words or paragraphs 
(as used in Rooduijn and Pauwels’ work). The scoring varies from 0 (no populist elements 
identified in the document) to 2 (very strong and systematic use of populist discourse). 
Coders are instructed to look at whether party manifestos contain references to the ‘popular 
will’, as well as negative opinions on the political or economic elite in general. In each 
country two coders have examined party manifestos and the final score reflects the average of 
the scoring assigned by the coders. All party manifestos are in their original language and the 
coders have a native or near-native knowledge of the language. 
Holistic grading presents several advantages for our research objectives. First, it can 
easily be applied to different parties and countries, allowing us to compare new cases not yet 
covered by the literature to other European counterparts. Second, this technique provides the 
opportunity to code several documents, thus examining the evolution of populist discourse 
before and after the crisis. Finally, it allows us to interpret political discourse, that is, it offers 
a more fine-grained analysis of the context and the arguments used by both mainstream and 
challenger parties.  
Our units of analysis are the party manifestos of all parliamentary parties in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain (see appendix). Party manifestos are considered to represent and express 
the policy collectively adopted by the party (Budge et al. 2001). Moreover, as a number of 
works have already highlighted (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011), this type of source presents 
other positive aspects. First, these documents provide a clear overview of the arguments 
deployed by parties during election campaigns. Second, these texts are readily available and 
are easily comparable across countries, parties and elections. As for the time frame, in order 
to gauge populist trends over time we select at least one party manifesto in the pre-crisis era 
and one in the post-crisis period. 
We present the holistic grading scores in the next section. We checked the reliability 
of coding and the robustness of these scores in two ways. First, we compared them to the 
values obtained by using Rooduijn and Pauwels’ technique (2011) based on a content 
analysis of party manifestos. This method has been widely used for measuring the degree of 
populism of a party in Western European countries. The Pearson correlation index between 
holistic grading scores (values for 2015 in our three countries) and the scores derived from 
the codification of party manifestos using Rooduijn and Pauwels’ technique (2011) equals 
+0.82 (for 14 cases). Second, we compare holistic grading with the anti-elitist scale included 
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in the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert data (Polk et al. 2017). The Pearson correlation between these 
two measures equals +0.71 (for 17 cases).3  
In order to qualify the variety of populism in Greece, Portugal and Spain, we use the 
dimensions identified by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) to distinguish between 
inclusionary and exclusionary populism. Consequently, we complement the quantitative 
longitudinal analysis with the examination of the material, symbolic and political dimensions.  
 
 
Populism and the crisis in Greece, Portugal and Spain: the background 
 
In contrast to Portugal and Spain, populism has a long history and a strong presence in 
Greece. It is often argued that populism was brought into the mainstream of Greek politics by 
PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) in the aftermath of the 1974 democratic transition 
(Lyrintzis 1987). PASOK’s successful populist appeals to the ‘underpriviledged’ led to 
populist ‘contagion’ (Pappas 2014), as New Democracy (ND), the centre-right pole of what 
turned out to be Greece’s stable two-party system up until 2012, adopted similar discourses in 
order to secure its place on the electoral map (Mavrogordatos 1997). While the two main 
parties continued to alternate in power until the 2009 election, Greek voters’ party 
identification and levels of trust in the political system had been in decline since at least 2007 
(Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014: 224–228). 
During the first year of the economic crisis (2010-2011), PASOK, a party of social 
democracy, adopted severe austerity measures in return for a bail-out loan from the European 
Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou 2013). 
Over the crisis period the populist discourse of SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left), an 
established minor party of the radical left - whose aim was to express and represent the 
economic concerns and anti-party sentiments of the Greek voters that were distancing 
themselves from PASOK and the other mainstream parties - struck a chord with disillusioned 
Greek voters. SYRIZA was successful in replacing PASOK as one of the two major parties in 
Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Tsakatika 2016). On the right and far right, the 
Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn, were also successful in mobilising a lesser, but still 
significant, proportion of the vote, through the politicisation of immigration and the adoption 
of populist frames. The peculiarity of the Greek case when compared to the Iberian countries 
has been the growing salience of immigration, which particularly after the 1990s emerged as 
a key issue in party competition (Ellinas 2013, Karamanidou 2015). Therefore an additional 
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point of confrontation related to the cultural cleavage was also present in Greek party politics 
when the economic crisis was transformed into a political crisis.  
As far as Portugal is concerned, two key aspects are worthy of examination to 
understand the peculiarities of its political context and party strategies. First, no radical right 
parties have succeeded in Portugal, due to organisational, programmatic and leadership 
failures (Marchi 2013). Second, Portugal has been considered an outlier in the populist 
zeitgeist that has populated European politics over the last decades (Salgado and Zúquete 
2017). The main example that resembles European populist counterparts is the National 
Renewal Party (PNR, Partido Nacional Renovador), an extreme-right wing party that has 
remained a marginal actor in the party system, never achieving more than 0.5 per cent of the 
votes (Marchi 2013; Salgado and Zúquete 2017). The economic and political crisis that 
followed the bailout and the Troika intervention has facilitated the emergence of several new 
parties that ran in the 2015 elections. Among these, only the PDR (Republican Democratic 
Party, Partido Renovador Democrático) has adopted an unorthodox style of political 
communication centred on its leader (António Marinho e Pinto) and a strong anti-elite 
rhetoric. However, these new parties have failed to innovate the Portuguese party system, 
whereas the main parties have adopted a very conventional electoral campaign, both in terms 
of style and issues (De Giorgi and Pereira 2016). This is also confirmed by the Chapel Hill 
expert survey, which includes an item related to the anti-establishment rhetoric adopted by 
European parties. According to these data, Portugal scored relatively low in 2014 in the anti-
elitism scale, below the European average and other Southern European countries. 
The Spanish party system that emerged after Franco's death was characterised by the 
absence of populist appeals and discourses. The democratic transition gave rise to a party 
system structured along two basic dimensions (left-right and centre-periphery). After the 
demise of the centre-right UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático) in 1982, the PSOE (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español) and the PP (Partido Popular) remained the two main parties in 
the system. They always formed single-party governments at the national level, even if on 
many occasions they had to rely on the support of other forces. Until 2014 party system 
stability went hand in hand with a strong ideological structuration and a persistent absence of 
anti-elite and populist discourses. A few wealthy businessmen attempted to enter the political 
arena based on anti-party and populist platforms, but they attained very limited successes (a 
seat in the European Parliament for Ruiz Mateos in 1989 and control of the Southern city 
councils of Marbella and other neighbouring towns in the case of Jesús Gil from 1991 
onwards). As in Portugal, and due to a complex combination of demand- and supply side 
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factors (privileged position of the PP in centre-periphery conflicts and inability of extreme 
right organizations to adapt their discourse to anti-immigration voters), the Spanish radical 
right proved unable to make any electoral breakthrough after democratic transition 
(Llamazares 2012).  
However, the Great Recession and the policy switch that the PSOE put into practice 
after 2010 led to a deep representation crisis in the Spanish party system. This crisis was 
aggravated by public outrage at corruption scandals coming to light in those same years. The 
collapse of the PSOE in the 2011 elections, and the populist mobilisation that crystallised in 
the 15-M movement as a reaction to austerity policies and political corruption paved the way 
for the birth and 2014 electoral breakthrough of Podemos, a party that deliberately adopted a 
populist rhetoric (Giménez 2014; Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2018) In the 2014 European 
elections the party attained 8 per cent of the vote. In the 2015 local elections the candidates 
endorsed by Podemos became the mayors of the two main Spanish cities, Madrid and 
Barcelona. And in the 2015 national elections Podemos and its political allies achieved 
almost 21 per cent of the vote. The 2015 general elections witnessed also the upsurge of 
Ciudadanos, a centrist party that called for a profound renovation of political life and political 
institutions and which attained all of a sudden 13.9 per cent of the votes.  
 
 
Populism in Southern Europe through holistic grading: results 
 
Overall, content analysis reveals considerably higher levels of populism among Greek 
political parties in comparison to Portugal and Spain (see Figure 1). We also find that the 
crisis does not show a general trend on the evolution of populism. Remarkably and counter-
intuitively, it would seem that average populism scores in Greece have slightly declined since 
the beginning of the economic crisis. However, if we consider the averages of populism 
scores weighed according to electoral performance across Greek parliamentary elections 
between 2007, the last pre-crisis election won by New Democracy and January 2015, and the 
elections that brought the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition to power, there is little variation in the 
average levels of populism encountered in the Greek political system, despite the fact that in 
the meantime the later had undergone radical change (see Table 1). These findings seem at 
odds with our expectation that the crisis heralded higher levels of populism.4 
The Portuguese case shows clearly the lowest levels of populism. The difference with 
other new Southern European democracies is even bigger if we consider weighted scores, 
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which demonstrates that populism in Portugal is only related to the periphery of the party 
system. Indeed, both PCP and BE have displayed some degree of populism, whereas 
governing parties have been constantly reluctant to adopt a populist strategy (Table 2). As for 
longitudinal trends, we cannot really see a clear impact of the crisis. If we take 2008 as the 
beginning of the crisis, populist scores seem to increase after the crisis. However, the 2009 
elections were not actually characterised by the discussion of austerity measures. Therefore, 
our interpretation is that on average the degree of populist discourse has remained relatively 
stable over time.  
By contrast, Spain shows a very high increase in the average supply-side level of 
party populism, which jumped from 0.27 in 2008, the last pre-crisis elections, to 0.47 in 2011 
and 0.53 in 2015 (Table 3). However, if we weigh our scores by electoral success we get a 
much more stable image of the evolution of populism in the Spanish party system. Weighted 
populism levels moved from 0.17 in 2008 to 0.25 in 2011 and 0.23 in 2015. These contrasting 
results derive from the fact that the PP, the most voted party in 2011 and 2015, drastically 
reduced the populist overtones of its discourse after gaining access to power in 2011. This 
fact is consistent with the expectation that parties have stronger incentives to use populist 
appeals when they are in opposition. On the other hand, the sharp rise in non-weighted 
average levels of populism after 2011 resulted from the fact that the two main parties 
rejecting austerity policies, the established IU-UP and the newly founded Podemos, 
articulated their proposals in a populist discursive framework. Interestingly, voting behaviour 
studies on the 2015 elections have shown that populist attitudes were one of the elements 
affecting (directly and in interaction with ideological positions) vote for Podemos, IU-UP, 
Ciudadanos and, negatively in this case, the PP (Andreadis et al. 2018). That is, although by 
2015 weighted populism levels were not much higher than before the Great Recession, 
populist discourses were more present in the party system than in 2011, and furthermore, 
populist public attitudes had direct and indirect effects on vote-choices.   
 
[Figure 1: about here] 
 
Our analysis also highlights interesting differences between two groups of parties. 
Moderate and governing parties exhibit in general lower scores than challenger parties. As 
expected, mainstream parties seem rather immune to populist appeals, with rare elements 
associated to anti-elitist rhetoric or the ‘popular will’. The exception here is the Greek case 
where mainstream parties also adopt populist discourses when this offers them an advantage 
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in party competition. Two examples are PASOK’s high score in the 2007 manifesto (2) when 
the party was challenging ND for office and ND’s populist high watermark (1.5) in 2012, 
which can be explained by the fact that for a brief period (2010-2012) ND chose to conduct 
populist opposition to PASOK before being forced to join coalition governments with 
PASOK between 2012 and 2015. When they have not chosen to adopt populist discourses 
Greek mainstream parties tend to speak of the citizens, society and ‘people’, as well as the 
country and only secondarily of Greeks, while they tend to present ‘demagogues’, 
bureaucrats and partyism as the ‘enemy’. On the other hand, challenger parties present higher 
levels of populism. However, country differences remain stronger than the variation within 
each category of party type. Within this group, Greece still displays the highest scores, while 
Portugal presents the lowest values. 
Another issue addressed in our theoretical framework consists of assessing whether 
ideologically radical parties are more populist than moderate ones or not. Overall, the 
findings do confirm our expectations and previous works (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017). 
Yet, it is interesting to note that populism is not a generalised strategy for newly created 
parties. While there have not been new successful populist parties in Portugal, the level of 
populism for new parties in Greece and Spain is not higher than old ones. Of all the Greek 
parties analysed, it is only ANEL, POTAMI and DIMAR that emerged as new parties in the 
aftermath of the crisis and their discourses do not score higher in terms of populism than most 
established political parties on the right or left. The fact that the two new parties in Spain are 
characterised by comparatively high (Podemos) and low (Ciudadanos) populist scores seems 
to contradict the expectation that new parties will display higher populist scores. 
 
[Table 1: about here] 
 
[Table 2: about here] 
 
[Table 3: about here] 
 
 
After assessing how the degree of populism varies across countries and party types, 
we qualify the content of populist discourse through means of qualitative analysis. We begin 
by focussing on the two parties that constitute Greece’s ruling coalition, SYRIZA, the major 
partner and Independent Greeks, the minor partner, asking how they fare in terms of the 
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inclusionary-exclusionary dimension of populism. With respect to the economic dimension, 
SYRIZA clearly supports an inclusionary policy of welfare state expansion to improve the 
lives of those groups that are subject to deprivation, exclusion or discrimination, particularly 
exacerbated by the economic crisis, in particular the less well off, the unemployed, women, 
the young and immigrants/refugees (SYRIZA 2012: 5). These are all groups to which power, 
income and rights should be extended because they constitute ‘the people’ (Tsakatika et al. 
2015). In terms of the political dimension SYRIZA actively supported extra-parliamentary 
mobilisation and inclusive direct democratic practices (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou 2013) and 
advocated the more generalised use of referenda at national and European levels (SYRIZA 
2014) while in opposition. Once in government, SYRIZA extended citizenship law to second 
generation migrants in Greece. Moving on to the symbolic dimension, in ways not dissimilar 
to inclusive populist frames elsewhere in the world, SYRIZA characterised Greek political 
and economic elites as subservient to foreign powers such as banks and multinationals, the 
Troika and its components (EC/ECB/IMF) and particularly until 2015, Germany and the 
German leadership (SYRIZA 2012: 2; 2014). SYRIZA can hence be considered a party that 
clearly leans towards inclusionary populism. 
On the contrary, the Independent Greeks can be characterised as an exclusionary 
populist party, largely by virtue of their positions - while in opposition - on the question of 
immigration. On the economic dimension, ANEL would see ‘illegal’ migration eradicated 
and quotas introduced for legal migration, defined as a percentage of the Greek population 
(ANEL 2015: 6); they have also put forward policy proposals such as the immediate 
deportation of migrants involved in illegal commercial activities (ANEL 2012: 27). In the 
political and symbolic dimensions ANEL can be considered exclusionary by virtue of their 
opposition to multi-culturalism and the close articulation of national identity, the people and 
Orthodox Christianity (ANEL 2015: 11).   
The co-habitation of an inclusionary with an exclusionary populist party in 
government (Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016) is highly unusual and has on occasion 
led to intra-governmental disagreements, with the Independent Greeks for example not 
supporting SYRIZA’s citizenship law which involved extending citizenship to second 
generation migrants (Kathimerini 2015). Nonetheless, it must be kept in mind that the Greek 
case confirms the expectation that in the aftermath of an economic crisis in Southern Europe 
it would be the inclusionary type of populism that could be expected to dominate. Indeed, 
SYRIZA’s inclusionary version of populism has been significantly more electorally 
successful (36.3 per cent) than the exclusionary version represented by the Independent 
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Greeks (4.6 per cent) and Golden Dawn (6.3 per cent) if we take the 2015 elections as a 
benchmark. That said, the expectation that exclusionary populism will also emerge where the 
cultural cleavage is activated via the immigration issue is also confirmed. 
As far as Portugal is concerned, both radical parties are close to the inclusionary type 
of populism, as both forces defend the protection of the welfare state - to reduce 
unemployment, poverty and improve the healthcare system – and the lower sectors of society. 
Both BE and PCP have always supported the expansion of social policies through an increase 
in public spending (Freire and Lisi 2016). Indeed, one of their core principles has always 
been to help improve the life conditions of weak socioeconomic groups. Finally, they both 
advocate the nationalisation of certain sectors (i.e. transports) and state control on specific 
industries, as well as the ‘democratic’ control of the bank, which is manipulated and 
controlled by foreign capitals. 
However, when we look at the political and symbolic dimensions, a qualitative 
analysis unveils some peculiarities worthy of examination. On the one hand, their populist 
discourse is based more on the fact that ‘real’ democracy was incompatible with the 
dominance of European institutions and the most powerful countries through austerity 
policies, rather than on broader political participation (as ‘inclusionary’ populism 
conventionally entails). On the other, the two forces have conceptualised the symbolic 
dimension in rather different terms. In the communist election manifestos, the term ‘people’ 
is frequently used, always as a synonymous of workers within a Marxist theoretical 
framework. The defence of sovereignty, national dignity and the people’s interests were the 
main objectives of the alternative based on a left and patriotic government (PCP 2015). By 
contrast, there are no direct references to the ‘people’ in the BE 2015 election program5. This 
left-libertarian party has come closer to the ‘new generation’ of left-wing populism – like 
SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain -, characterised by a rejection of a traditional 
Marxist interpretation if social conflicts and by the attempt to build an ‘interclassist’ 
approach. 
The analysis of the Portuguese case reveals that, although radical left parties have 
adopted an ‘inclusionary’ discourse in terms of socio-economic case, this is not an innovation 
compared to their ideological and programmatic legacy. The crisis has fostered a populist 
discourse based on the criticism towards external – i.e. European – actors and the EU 
democratic deficit. While the ideological legacy accounts for the different tones and 
arguments used by the two radical left parties, party strategy was also important in 
articulating populist arguments. 
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The qualitative analysis for the Spanish case resembles to a great extent Portuguese 
parties, at least in terms of the domestic dimension. The electoral programs of UP-IU and 
Podemos were characterised by their intense pro-redistributive proposals, their defence of 
civic and political liberties, their emphasis on democratic participation, and their opposition 
to restrictive immigration policies (Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2018; Torreblanca 2015). 
No exclusionary proposals were included in the 2015, and 2016 electoral programs of the two 
national parties adopting the most populist discourses according to holistic grading analysis. 
The electoral programs of Podemos and IU-UP emphasised the systemic association between 
political elites, large firms, and financial capital. By contrast, neither xenophobic nor anti-EU 
statements were present in the manifestos of these two political actors. The Podemos 
programs for 2015 and 2016 proposed the restructuring the Spanish debt so that banking 
institutions would pay back the loans they received from the European Stability Mechanism. 
They also proposed the overhaul of the EU stability pact and the reform of the statutes of the 
European Central Bank so that the fight against unemployment became one of its main goals 
(Podemos 2016: 134 and 136). However, they also proposed the development of a common 
EU fiscal policy and of an ambitious EU budget (Podemos 2016: 136). Podemos policy 
proposals were remarkably inclusionary in the political and symbolic domains, demanding 
the access of immigrants to full social benefits and protection. In general, our content analysis 
confirms the absence of exclusionary populism in the Spanish party system (at least at the 
national level) and the inclusionary, redistributive, and libertarian character of Podemos and 





This paper explores the use that political parties in new Southern Europe have made 
of populist discourse after the onset of the Great Recession. Our paper was based on a set of 
interrelated expectations regarding cross-temporal, cross-partisan, and cross-national 
variations in the uses of populism in Greece, Portugal and Spain. In the first place, we 
assumed that the social malaise triggered by the European crisis had led to a substantial 
increase in the presence of populist elements in party discourses. In the second place, based 
on the ideational theory on populism and previous comparative analyses, we assumed that 
populist elements would be more prevalent among ideologically extreme parties (both right 
and left) and challenger parties opposing well established political players. We also assumed 
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that, given the severe social costs imposed by economic crisis and austerity policies, populist 
discourses would have a predominantly inclusionary character in the material, redistributive 
domain. However, when political-cultural issues (such as immigration or European 
integration) had been previously activated by political actors, populist discourses could also 
take a xenophobic (or nationalist) and culturally exclusionary character. Finally, as far as 
cross-national differences are concerned, we also expected that current changes would not 
definitively erase previous contrasts between Greece and the two Iberian countries regarding 
the extension of populist discourse, and that the uses of populism would continue to be more 
frequent in the former case. We have used the holistic grading of party manifestos to evaluate 
these claims empirically. 
Our expectation regarding the evolution of populism works relatively well in the case 
of Spain, moderately in the case of Portugal, and not at all in the case of Greece. In the latter 
case, levels of populism were relatively stable between 2007 and 2015. In Spain supply-side 
populism increased very substantially from 2008 to 2011 and 2015. However, weighted 
populism grew very moderately from 2008 to 2011, and then remained at a very similar level 
in the 2015 elections. In Portugal, supply-side populism experienced also a substantial 
increase from 2005 to 2009, and it maintained relatively stable levels until 2015, when its 
value was in fact substantially higher than in 2005.  
As far as the cross-partisan variations in the levels of populism are concerned, our 
data confirm the expectation that populism is associated to challenger parties, which adopt 
populist frames to criticise mainstream forces and erode their popular support. In addition, 
the use of populist rhetoric seems to be associated to party strategy, as the shifts between 
government and opposition seem to show, thus confirming our expectation. We also find that 
there is a strong association between ideological radicalism and degree of populism. Extreme 
or radical parties clearly show higher levels of populism than moderate parties, as shown by 
the +0.66 Pearson correlation between populism scores and an indicator of left-right 
radicalism based on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017, see also Rooduijn 
et al. 2014). Our data endorse also the interpretation of populism as a discursive resource that 
can be used by groups espousing different ideologies. Now, while in Portugal and Spain there 
is also a very strong association between left-right party positions (Polk et al. 2017) and 
populism scores (Pearson correlation of -0.81 for all Iberian parties), in Greece this 
association is entirely absent. That is, while Iberian populisms have a predominantly leftist 
character, Greek populism is equally present at both extremes of the ideological spectrum. 
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As for the inclusionary-exclusionary character of populist discourses, our qualitative 
case discussions showed the prevalence of materially inclusive, redistributive proposals 
among the parties employing populist rhetoric elements. This is also reflected by the 
statistical association between populist scores and the positions of parties in the redistribution 
versus market dimension mapped in the CHES 2014 survey (Polk et al. 2017) (r=-0.56) and 
by the even stronger association between these two variables when we restrict the analysis to 
the Iberian cases (r=-0.73). This means that, in general, populist parties tend to be more pro-
redistributive, and if we focus on the Iberian Peninsula this association becomes particularly 
strong. As indicated previously, this phenomenon can be explained not only by the dramatic 
effects of the austerity policies implemented in these three countries, but also by the 
persistence of the socio-economic cleavage as the main dimension of party competition and 
the previous lack of party system responsiveness on the left-side of the political spectrum. 
However, the Greek case shows also the possibility of parties adopting explicitly 
exclusionary populist discourses in the symbolic, polity boundary dimension, a fact that can 
be connected to the greater salience of immigration, its previous politicisation in this country 
and the presence of political entrepreneurs on the right and far right (ANEL, LAOS, Golden 
Dawn) who over the course of the crisis engaged in competition over the anti-immigration 
vote (Ellinas 2013: 557).6 
Finally, our data show that despite the attenuation of cross-national differences, the 
use of populist rhetoric has remained substantially higher in Greece than in Portugal and 
Spain. This endorses the interpretation that national legacies matter, and that the previous and 
successful activation of populist styles may have created a persistent pattern or populist 
rhetoric in party competition. Despite this, strategic choices are also key for understanding 
cross-time variations, for example the fact that parties in opposition moving to government 
are prone to reduce populist rhetoric and vice versa. Overall, the findings lend support to the 
dilemma between responsible and responsive parties magisterially elaborated by Mair (2011). 
Although ideational theory goes a long way to understanding cross-country, cross-
time and cross-partisan variations, it does not explain in and of itself the success of populist 
parties. This is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that this study cannot address. 
One interesting puzzle in this regard is the lack of party system innovation of the Portuguese 
case. Our findings show that the protest and populist component of the two radical left parties 
may have channelled voters’ dissatisfaction with mainstream parties. But there are certainly 
other factors at play, such as voters’ demobilisation (Morlino and Raniolo 2017), the lack of 
populist leaders (Marchi 2013) or the high polarisation of the party system7.  
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The scope of this analysis is limited to just three South European countries. However, 
this focused comparison has both comparative and theoretical interest. On the one hand, 
empirical studies on the characteristics of populism in these countries are needed. On the 
other, this analysis can enrich our understanding of the factors conditioning the evolution and 
the substantive political content of populism in Europe after the Great Recession. Future 
research should aim to expand the empirical analysis both geographically and longitudinally, 
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Figure 1: Average levels of populism in Greece, Portugal and Spain (2005-2015) 
 
Notes: a) country average; b) weighted scores (based on electoral performance). 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Table 1: Populism scores in Greek parties (2007, 2009, 2012 and 2015 elections) 
 
Party 2007 2009 2012 (May) 2015 (Jan) 
KKE 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 
SYRIZA 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.4* 
DIMAR - - 1 - 
POTAMI - - - 0.5* 
PASOK 2 1 0.3 0.1* 
ND 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.4* 
ANEL - - 1.5 0.5* 
LAOS 1.6 1.8 - - 
GD - - 2 2 
     
Average 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.0 
Weighed average 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.9 




Table 2: Populism scores in Portuguese parties (2005-2015) 
 Party 2005 2009 2011 2015 
BE 0.25 0.7 0.5 0.4 
CDS-PP 0 0 0 0 
PCP 0.55 0.8 0.7 0.7 
PS 0 0 0.05 0.2 
PSD 0.05 0 0.05 0 
     
Average 0.17 0.3 0.26 0.27 
Weighted average 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 




Table 3: Populism scores for Spanish parties with more than 3 per cent of the national 
vote (2008, 2011, and 2015 elections).  
 
Party 2008* 2011** 2015*** 
PP 0.4 0.4 0.2 
PSOE 0 0 0.15 
Podemos   0.65 
Ciudadanos   0.15 
UP/IU 0.4 1 1.15 
    
Average 0.27 0.47 0.53 
Weighted average 0.17 0.25 0.23 
 
 
*Source: Our elaboration 
**Source: Hawkins and Castanho Silva (2016). 





                                               
1 Both dimensions are included in Kriesi and Pappas’ work (2015). According to their indicators, Italy seems to 
diverge from new Southern European countries as it did not experience a deep economic crisis (only a political 
one). 
2 The concept of ‘challenger party’ refers to those actors that have never participated in government coalitions 
(see van der Ward et al. 2014; Hobolt and Tilley 2016). 
3 Polk et al report a +0.51 correlation between the CHES anti-elitism indicator and Rooduijn and Pauwels’s 
scores for the parties in the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. 
4 We know that in the January 2015 elections populist attitudes had a positive impact on voting for SYRIZA, 
ANEL, and the KKE (Andreadis et al. 2018), but we lack comparable empirical evidence for previous elections 
and cannot ascertain whether the electoral effects of populist attitudes changed across time. 
5 One of the few references to the people in BE’s manifestos can be found in 2011 electoral program, when it 
uses the term ‘people’ to identify the victim of the bailout negotiation (BE 2011: 29).  
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6 The associations between populism and the positions regarding immigration and multiculturalism are non-
existent at the Southern European level (Pearson correlations of -0.14 and -0.07 respectively), but they are 
strong for the Iberian parties (correlations of -0.73 and -0.72 respectively, populist parties being more favorable 
to immigration and multiculturalism). 
7 According to Dalton’s index, Portugal displayed higher levels of polarisation than Greece and Spain during the 
crisis period (data available through the ParlGov website: http://www.parlgov.org/). 
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Greece, Portugal and Spain are among the countries worst hit by the 2008 Great Recession, 
with significant electoral and political turmoil since then. However, one of the dimensions in 
which they differ is the presence and varieties of populism in parties’ political proposals. 
Drawing on holistic coding of party manifestos, we assess the varying presence of populist 
features in mainstream and challenging parties before and after the 2008 economic 
downturn. Our empirical findings show that populism is significantly higher in Greece 
compared to Spain and Portugal. We do not find a significant impact of the crisis as the 
degree of populism remains rather stable in Greece and Portugal, while it increases in Spain, 
mainly due to the rise of new populist forces. In addition, inclusionary populism is the 
predominant flavour of populist parties in new Southern Europe, although exclusionary 
populism is present to a lesser extent in the Greek case. Finally, we contend the national 
context - namely the ideological legacy of parties and the strategic options of party 
leadership -, is crucial for explaining cross-country variation in the intensity of populism and 
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As a result of the ‘Great Recession’, mainstream parties have faced electoral setbacks 
and challenger parties have gained growing strength in national party systems. While 
traditional party families (i.e. social democrats, Christian democrats, liberals) are losing 
popular support, a number of populist parties have made inroads into European political 
systems, destabilising usual alignments and patterns of competition. Although scholars 
disagree on the magnitude of the populist earthquake shattering democracies in affluent 
societies and whether the process came to a halt, they tend to acknowledge that, from a 
marginal phenomenon, populist parties have now become a persistent and quite successful 
political actor in Europe.  
The economic and financial crisis has impacted significantly on party system change 
in Southern Europe (Bosco and Verney 2016). Greece, Portugal and Spain, three new South 
European democracies, until recently characterised by stable party systems and centripetal 
dynamics of party competition based on two moderate forces, have experienced increasing 
fragmentation and an opening structure of party competition since the economic crisis 
(Morlino and Raniolo 2017). The emergence and success of new ‘populist’ actors have been 
one key element behind this major shift. Yet, distinct trajectories can be seen, showing 
different patterns of party system change. While in Spain two new parties, one on the left and 
populist, have shattered the two-partyism established in the post-Franco era, in Portugal 
established actors have succeeded in averting the entrance of new political forces, populist or 
otherwise. On the other hand, Greece has experienced a new ‘populist era’ through the 
success of populist parties mainly on the left and less prominently, though still significantly, 
on the right. 
This paper is primarily devoted to examining and explaining variation in the extent 
and type of populism emerging in Greece, Portugal and Spain, in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis. By means of a content analysis of election manifestos using holistic grading 
and a qualitative assessment of populist frames, it aims to contribute to an empirical analysis 
of the spread of populism in new Southern Europe across countries, party types and party 
systems. These three cases have been selected not only because they experienced a similar 
economic and political crisis since 20081, but also because they underwent parallel 
trajectories in terms of democratic consolidation and party system institutionalisation 
(Morlino 1998; Diamandouros and Gunther 2001). How do these countries differ in terms of 
degree of populism? Has the crisis increased the overall level of populism in new Southern 
European countries? And what is the ideological bent of the populist frames adopted by 
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distinct political parties? These are the main research questions that this study aims to 
address. 
Our purpose, we stress at the outset, is not to determine the factors that explain the 
pervasiveness of populism, nor to test whether the crisis caused the emergence or electoral 
success of populist parties (see on this Hawkins et al. 2017; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2017). Addressing such goals would demand a drastic expansion of the cases included in the 
analysis. Our goal here is much more modest, and it consists in the qualitative analysis of 
cross-national and diachronic variations in the levels and content in populist proposals in 
three countries that have shared important political and socioeconomic features over the last 
decades. Although it might be possible to approach our topic using quantitative methods (for 
example through public opinion surveys), we employ qualitative case studies because the 
question of context – namely ideological legacies and party strategies – would appear to be 
crucial for understanding the spreading of the populist phenomenon in new Southern 
European democracies. 
The paper is structured as follows. We address in the next section key theoretical 
issues for the study of populism and lay out our main expectations concerning the emergence 
of populism in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. In the following section we present our empirical 
research strategy and the type of data we analyse. Section four focuses on the political 
background of the three countries and the trajectory of party system during the crisis. We 
discuss our main empirical findings in section five. Finally, we conclude by presenting some 




The European crisis and the emergence of populism: literature review  
 
Cas Mudde’s established minimal definition of populism is that of ‘an ideology that 
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 
‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an 
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 2004: 543). Populism 
is deemed a ‘thin centred’ ideology because its core can be combined with other ideologies 
‘thick’ or ‘thin’, such as communism, nationalism, or ecologism (Albertazzi and McDonnell 
2008; Canovan 2004; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). A variation on the understanding of 
populism as a ‘thin ideology’ is populism as a style or discourse of politics, i.e. not 
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expressing core beliefs but a mode of political expression employed strategically by its 
proponents (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). Populism thus seen allows for the study of the 
phenomenon as a ‘gradational property’ rather than as an essential quality of particular 
parties (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013: 7-10, Rooduijn et al. 2014).   
A significant distinction among populisms drawn in the comparative literature is that 
between an egalitarian, inclusionary type, which until recently has been more successful in 
the left movements of Latin America, and a xenophobic, exclusionary type to be found 
mostly in the far-right parties that have developed in Europe since the 1980s (Mudde and 
Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). The distinction is analysed on the basis of three dimensions: 
material, political, and symbolic (Filc 2010: 128–38). The material dimension concerns the 
distribution of resources among social groups with inclusionary populist parties in favour of 
mass welfare programmes to include the poor and exclusionary populisms defending forms of 
welfare chauvinism that aims to protect established welfare insiders from immigrant 
outsiders. The political dimension refers to forms of political mobilisation that go beyond 
representative democratic channels such as plebiscitary and local forms of radical democracy. 
Inclusionary populisms mean for these mechanisms to give a voice to disregarded groups 
while exclusionary populisms also advocate similar devices but demand the 
disenfranchisement of immigrant groups. Finally, the symbolic dimension involves setting 
the boundaries of ‘the people’, with inclusionary movements highlighting, for instance, the 
‘dignity’ of indigenous populations, while symbolic exclusion often draws on forms of 
cultural discrimination (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).  
It has been widely argued that economic crises facilitate populism (Stavrakakis 2014; 
Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Moffit 2016). Such events have ‘catalysing effects’ that intensify 
long standing problems (Morlino and Raniolo 2017: 22). Such are the long term trends of 
increasing economic inequality and social exclusion that have accompanied technological 
displacement, deep changes in the world of work and welfare and neoliberal economic 
policies (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 2). Economic crises reinforce the divide between 
globalisation’s ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ (Kriesi 2014). In addition, the crisis has increased 
political discontent and mistrust towards representative institutions, a situation that seems 
strongly connected to the success of populist parties (Moffit 2015; Rooduijn et al. 2016). This 
is particularly the case of Southern European countries, characterised by a significant 
worsening of different components of democratic legitimacy such as trust in the parliament, 
trust in political parties or satisfaction with democracy (Muro and Vidal 2017). In so doing 
they provide fertile ground for challenger parties to blame national elites and mainstream 
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political parties for the economic and social woes of globalisation’s ‘losers’ (Hobolt and 
Tilley 2016). Higher levels of populism also seem to be more common among parties on the 
left and right extremes of the ideological continuum than among mainstream parties 
(Rooduijn et al. 2014; Polk et al. 2017). 
The key factors that are likely to favour the emergence or predominance of 
inclusionary rather than exclusionary populism in the aftermath of an economic crisis can be 
argued to lie in high levels of crisis intensity, in the retrenchment of welfare states in the face 
of economic crisis (Kriesi and Pappas 2015), and in the lack of partisan programmatic 
responsiveness (Bornschier 2010; Roberts 2013 and 2015). On the other hand, exclusionary 
populism, which is mostly associated to transformations taking place in the cultural and 
symbolic dimensions, is more likely to emerge when the salience of immigration increases 
and mainstream right-wing parties do not politicise or give priority to xenophobic public 
preferences (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013). 
New Southern European democracies have provided a fertile environment for the 
emergence of inclusionary populism for two main reasons. On the one hand, the Great 
Recession has brought to the fore materialist concerns, increasing the salience of socio-
economic cleavages (Kriesi 2014: 369-70). On the other, these countries have also 
experienced a strong responsiveness crisis, as socialist parties have adopted neoliberal 
policies that contradicted their founding principles. A number of authors have argued that this 
programmatic dealignment facilitates the emergence of populist contenders of the 
inclusionary type that promise to restore equality and dignity. 
However, the general links between populism and economic crisis are insufficient to 
account for cross-national, cross-partisan, and even cross-time variations in the levels and 
substantive contents of populist appeals in Greece, Portugal and Spain. A comparative 
explanation of such differences must take into consideration national contexts and legacies 
(Taggart 2017), party ideological frames (Moffit 2016; Taggart 2017; Polk et al. 2017), and 
party strategies (Pauwels 2011). In sum, we argue that ideational theory (Hawkins et al. 2017; 
2018) may explain to a great extent the different nuances that the variegated phenomenon of 
populism may take, even within the region most affected by the economic crisis. 
The previous discussion allows us to lay out our main empirical expectations. For the 
reasons we outlined above, and given the intensity of the effects of the Great Recession, we 
expect substantial increases in the populism levels in these three countries after 2008. Now, 
we also expect to find important differences in this regard between Greece and the two 
Iberian countries. The already established prevalence of populist rhetoric elements in the 
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Greek party system (Pappas 2013 and 2014; Vasilopoulou et al. 2014) should also lead to 
substantially higher populism levels in that country than in Portugal and Spain. As for cross-
partisan variations, for strategic reasons we expect populism levels to be higher among 
challenger2 and opposition parties. Such parties will be more inclined to appeal to dissatisfied 
voters by emphasising the unresponsiveness and selfishness of political and ruling elites. 
Although opposition parties are likely to employ more frequently a populist discourse, the 
move to government is expected to downsize the populist component (Heinish 2003). Also at 
the partisan level, ideologically more extreme parties will be more prone to articulate populist 
discourses directed against status quo elites that resist drastic changes in either direction of 
the ideological spectrum. And finally, given the intensity of the economic crisis, the hardship 
of austerity measures, and the centrality of socio-economic cleavages in these three party 
systems, we expect that materially inclusionary, redistributive populism will be the prevalent 
in these cases. However, the fact that anti-immigration appeals were previously activated in 
the Greek political arena (Ellinas 2013) - but not in Portugal (Marchi 2013) or Spain 
(Llamazares 2012) - leads us also to expect the presence of symbolically exclusionary 
components in the populist discourse of some Greek parties.  
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The difficulty of defining conceptually the populist phenomenon mirrors the 
ambiguity in measuring the degree of populism associated to distinct political actors. A 
number of approaches have been used to measure populism. Overall, these strategies rely on 
the ideological conceptualisation of populism (Mudde 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
2015) that consists of two main dimensions, namely 1) people centrism and 2) anti-elitism. 
The first dimension aims to measure references to the ‘people’, the ‘popular will’, the 
homogeneity of the people, etc. The second dimension refers to critiques towards political 
elites, conceived as the ‘evil’, a minority that controls key decisions against the interests of 
the people.  
To analyse populist discourse, the most common approach is based on content 
analysis of party documents. The two main variants are based on computerised content 
analysis and human-coded content analysis (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). This paper relies 
on a different approach based on holistic grading of party documents. This technique has 
been developed mainly by Hawkins and his team (Hawkins 2009 and 2013; Hawkins and 
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Castanho Silva 2016, 2018). Basically, it consists of attributing a score to the document 
(election manifesto or speeches) as a whole by looking at the degree of populist discourse. 
The key unit of analysis is the entire election manifesto, not the single words or paragraphs 
(as used in Rooduijn and Pauwels’ work). The scoring varies from 0 (no populist elements 
identified in the document) to 2 (very strong and systematic use of populist discourse). 
Coders are instructed to look at whether party manifestos contain references to the ‘popular 
will’, as well as negative opinions on the political or economic elite in general. In each 
country two coders have examined party manifestos and the final score reflects the average of 
the scoring assigned by the coders. All party manifestos are in their original language and the 
coders have a native or near-native knowledge of the language. 
Holistic grading presents several advantages for our research objectives. First, it can 
easily be applied to different parties and countries, allowing us to compare new cases not yet 
covered by the literature to other European counterparts. Second, this technique provides the 
opportunity to code several documents, thus examining the evolution of populist discourse 
before and after the crisis. Finally, it allows us to interpret political discourse, that is, it offers 
a more fine-grained analysis of the context and the arguments used by both mainstream and 
challenger parties.  
Our units of analysis are the party manifestos of all parliamentary parties in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain (see appendix). Party manifestos are considered to represent and express 
the policy collectively adopted by the party (Budge et al. 2001). Moreover, as a number of 
works have already highlighted (Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011), this type of source presents 
other positive aspects. First, these documents provide a clear overview of the arguments 
deployed by parties during election campaigns. Second, these texts are readily available and 
are easily comparable across countries, parties and elections. As for the time frame, in order 
to gauge populist trends over time we select at least one party manifesto in the pre-crisis era 
and one in the post-crisis period. 
We present the holistic grading scores in the next section. We checked the reliability 
of coding and the robustness of these scores in two ways. First, we compared them to the 
values obtained by using Rooduijn and Pauwels’ technique (2011) based on a content 
analysis of party manifestos. This method has been widely used for measuring the degree of 
populism of a party in Western European countries. The Pearson correlation index between 
holistic grading scores (values for 2015 in our three countries) and the scores derived from 
the codification of party manifestos using Rooduijn and Pauwels’ technique (2011) equals 
+0.82 (for 14 cases). Second, we compare holistic grading with the anti-elitist scale included 
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in the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert data (Polk et al. 2017). The Pearson correlation between these 
two measures equals +0.71 (for 17 cases).3  
In order to qualify the variety of populism in Greece, Portugal and Spain, we use the 
dimensions identified by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013) to distinguish between 
inclusionary and exclusionary populism. Consequently, we complement the quantitative 
longitudinal analysis with the examination of the material, symbolic and political dimensions.  
 
 
Populism and the crisis in Greece, Portugal and Spain: the background 
 
In contrast to Portugal and Spain, populism has a long history and a strong presence in 
Greece. It is often argued that populism was brought into the mainstream of Greek politics by 
PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) in the aftermath of the 1974 democratic transition 
(Lyrintzis 1987). PASOK’s successful populist appeals to the ‘underpriviledged’ led to 
populist ‘contagion’ (Pappas 2014), as New Democracy (ND), the centre-right pole of what 
turned out to be Greece’s stable two-party system up until 2012, adopted similar discourses in 
order to secure its place on the electoral map (Mavrogordatos 1997). While the two main 
parties continued to alternate in power until the 2009 election, Greek voters’ party 
identification and levels of trust in the political system had been in decline since at least 2007 
(Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014: 224–228). 
During the first year of the economic crisis (2010-2011), PASOK, a party of social 
democracy, adopted severe austerity measures in return for a bail-out loan from the European 
Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou 2013). 
Over the crisis period the populist discourse of SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left), an 
established minor party of the radical left - whose aim was to express and represent the 
economic concerns and anti-party sentiments of the Greek voters that were distancing 
themselves from PASOK and the other mainstream parties - struck a chord with disillusioned 
Greek voters. SYRIZA was successful in replacing PASOK as one of the two major parties in 
Greece (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Tsakatika 2016). On the right and far right, the 
Independent Greeks and Golden Dawn, were also successful in mobilising a lesser, but still 
significant, proportion of the vote, through the politicisation of immigration and the adoption 
of populist frames. The peculiarity of the Greek case when compared to the Iberian countries 
has been the growing salience of immigration, which particularly after the 1990s emerged as 
a key issue in party competition (Ellinas 2013, Karamanidou 2015). Therefore an additional 
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point of confrontation related to the cultural cleavage was also present in Greek party politics 
when the economic crisis was transformed into a political crisis.  
As far as Portugal is concerned, two key aspects are worthy of examination to 
understand the peculiarities of its political context and party strategies. First, no radical right 
parties have succeeded in Portugal, due to organisational, programmatic and leadership 
failures (Marchi 2013). Second, Portugal has been considered an outlier in the populist 
zeitgeist that has populated European politics over the last decades (Salgado and Zúquete 
2017). The main example that resembles European populist counterparts is the National 
Renewal Party (PNR, Partido Nacional Renovador), an extreme-right wing party that has 
remained a marginal actor in the party system, never achieving more than 0.5 per cent of the 
votes (Marchi 2013; Salgado and Zúquete 2017). The economic and political crisis that 
followed the bailout and the Troika intervention has facilitated the emergence of several new 
parties that ran in the 2015 elections. Among these, only the PDR (Republican Democratic 
Party, Partido Renovador Democrático) has adopted an unorthodox style of political 
communication centred on its leader (António Marinho e Pinto) and a strong anti-elite 
rhetoric. However, these new parties have failed to innovate the Portuguese party system, 
whereas the main parties have adopted a very conventional electoral campaign, both in terms 
of style and issues (De Giorgi and Pereira 2016). This is also confirmed by the Chapel Hill 
expert survey, which includes an item related to the anti-establishment rhetoric adopted by 
European parties. According to these data, Portugal scored relatively low in 2014 in the anti-
elitism scale, below the European average and other Southern European countries. 
The Spanish party system that emerged after Franco's death was characterised by the 
absence of populist appeals and discourses. The democratic transition gave rise to a party 
system structured along two basic dimensions (left-right and centre-periphery). After the 
demise of the centre-right UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático) in 1982, the PSOE (Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español) and the PP (Partido Popular) remained the two main parties in 
the system. They always formed single-party governments at the national level, even if on 
many occasions they had to rely on the support of other forces. Until 2014 party system 
stability went hand in hand with a strong ideological structuration and a persistent absence of 
anti-elite and populist discourses. A few wealthy businessmen attempted to enter the political 
arena based on anti-party and populist platforms, but they attained very limited successes (a 
seat in the European Parliament for Ruiz Mateos in 1989 and control of the Southern city 
councils of Marbella and other neighbouring towns in the case of Jesús Gil from 1991 
onwards). As in Portugal, and due to a complex combination of demand- and supply side 
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factors (privileged position of the PP in centre-periphery conflicts and inability of extreme 
right organizations to adapt their discourse to anti-immigration voters), the Spanish radical 
right proved unable to make any electoral breakthrough after democratic transition 
(Llamazares 2012).  
However, the Great Recession and the policy switch that the PSOE put into practice 
after 2010 led to a deep representation crisis in the Spanish party system. This crisis was 
aggravated by public outrage at corruption scandals coming to light in those same years. The 
collapse of the PSOE in the 2011 elections, and the populist mobilisation that crystallised in 
the 15-M movement as a reaction to austerity policies and political corruption paved the way 
for the birth and 2014 electoral breakthrough of Podemos, a party that deliberately adopted a 
populist rhetoric (Giménez 2014; Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2018) In the 2014 European 
elections the party attained 8 per cent of the vote. In the 2015 local elections the candidates 
endorsed by Podemos became the mayors of the two main Spanish cities, Madrid and 
Barcelona. And in the 2015 national elections Podemos and its political allies achieved 
almost 21 per cent of the vote. The 2015 general elections witnessed also the upsurge of 
Ciudadanos, a centrist party that called for a profound renovation of political life and political 
institutions and which attained all of a sudden 13.9 per cent of the votes.  
 
 
Populism in Southern Europe through holistic grading: results 
 
Overall, content analysis reveals considerably higher levels of populism among Greek 
political parties in comparison to Portugal and Spain (see Figure 1). We also find that the 
crisis does not show a general trend on the evolution of populism. Remarkably and counter-
intuitively, it would seem that average populism scores in Greece have slightly declined since 
the beginning of the economic crisis. However, if we consider the averages of populism 
scores weighed according to electoral performance across Greek parliamentary elections 
between 2007, the last pre-crisis election won by New Democracy and January 2015, and the 
elections that brought the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition to power, there is little variation in the 
average levels of populism encountered in the Greek political system, despite the fact that in 
the meantime the later had undergone radical change (see Table 1). These findings seem at 
odds with our expectation that the crisis heralded higher levels of populism.4 
The Portuguese case shows clearly the lowest levels of populism. The difference with 
other new Southern European democracies is even bigger if we consider weighted scores, 
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which demonstrates that populism in Portugal is only related to the periphery of the party 
system. Indeed, both PCP and BE have displayed some degree of populism, whereas 
governing parties have been constantly reluctant to adopt a populist strategy (Table 2). As for 
longitudinal trends, we cannot really see a clear impact of the crisis. If we take 2008 as the 
beginning of the crisis, populist scores seem to increase after the crisis. However, the 2009 
elections were not actually characterised by the discussion of austerity measures. Therefore, 
our interpretation is that on average the degree of populist discourse has remained relatively 
stable over time.  
By contrast, Spain shows a very high increase in the average supply-side level of 
party populism, which jumped from 0.27 in 2008, the last pre-crisis elections, to 0.47 in 2011 
and 0.53 in 2015 (Table 3). However, if we weigh our scores by electoral success we get a 
much more stable image of the evolution of populism in the Spanish party system. Weighted 
populism levels moved from 0.17 in 2008 to 0.25 in 2011 and 0.23 in 2015. These contrasting 
results derive from the fact that the PP, the most voted party in 2011 and 2015, drastically 
reduced the populist overtones of its discourse after gaining access to power in 2011. This 
fact is consistent with the expectation that parties have stronger incentives to use populist 
appeals when they are in opposition. On the other hand, the sharp rise in non-weighted 
average levels of populism after 2011 resulted from the fact that the two main parties 
rejecting austerity policies, the established IU-UP and the newly founded Podemos, 
articulated their proposals in a populist discursive framework. Interestingly, voting behaviour 
studies on the 2015 elections have shown that populist attitudes were one of the elements 
affecting (directly and in interaction with ideological positions) vote for Podemos, IU-UP, 
Ciudadanos and, negatively in this case, the PP (Andreadis et al. 2018). That is, although by 
2015 weighted populism levels were not much higher than before the Great Recession, 
populist discourses were more present in the party system than in 2011, and furthermore, 
populist public attitudes had direct and indirect effects on vote-choices.   
 
[Figure 1: about here] 
 
Our analysis also highlights interesting differences between two groups of parties. 
Moderate and governing parties exhibit in general lower scores than challenger parties. As 
expected, mainstream parties seem rather immune to populist appeals, with rare elements 
associated to anti-elitist rhetoric or the ‘popular will’. The exception here is the Greek case 
where mainstream parties also adopt populist discourses when this offers them an advantage 
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in party competition. Two examples are PASOK’s high score in the 2007 manifesto (2) when 
the party was challenging ND for office and ND’s populist high watermark (1.5) in 2012, 
which can be explained by the fact that for a brief period (2010-2012) ND chose to conduct 
populist opposition to PASOK before being forced to join coalition governments with 
PASOK between 2012 and 2015. When they have not chosen to adopt populist discourses 
Greek mainstream parties tend to speak of the citizens, society and ‘people’, as well as the 
country and only secondarily of Greeks, while they tend to present ‘demagogues’, 
bureaucrats and partyism as the ‘enemy’. On the other hand, challenger parties present higher 
levels of populism. However, country differences remain stronger than the variation within 
each category of party type. Within this group, Greece still displays the highest scores, while 
Portugal presents the lowest values. 
Another issue addressed in our theoretical framework consists of assessing whether 
ideologically radical parties are more populist than moderate ones or not. Overall, the 
findings do confirm our expectations and previous works (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017). 
Yet, it is interesting to note that populism is not a generalised strategy for newly created 
parties. While there have not been new successful populist parties in Portugal, the level of 
populism for new parties in Greece and Spain is not higher than old ones. Of all the Greek 
parties analysed, it is only ANEL, POTAMI and DIMAR that emerged as new parties in the 
aftermath of the crisis and their discourses do not score higher in terms of populism than most 
established political parties on the right or left. The fact that the two new parties in Spain are 
characterised by comparatively high (Podemos) and low (Ciudadanos) populist scores seems 
to contradict the expectation that new parties will display higher populist scores. 
 
[Table 1: about here] 
 
[Table 2: about here] 
 
[Table 3: about here] 
 
 
After assessing how the degree of populism varies across countries and party types, 
we qualify the content of populist discourse through means of qualitative analysis. We begin 
by focussing on the two parties that constitute Greece’s ruling coalition, SYRIZA, the major 
partner and Independent Greeks, the minor partner, asking how they fare in terms of the 
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inclusionary-exclusionary dimension of populism. With respect to the economic dimension, 
SYRIZA clearly supports an inclusionary policy of welfare state expansion to improve the 
lives of those groups that are subject to deprivation, exclusion or discrimination, particularly 
exacerbated by the economic crisis, in particular the less well off, the unemployed, women, 
the young and immigrants/refugees (SYRIZA 2012: 5). These are all groups to which power, 
income and rights should be extended because they constitute ‘the people’ (Tsakatika et al. 
2015). In terms of the political dimension SYRIZA actively supported extra-parliamentary 
mobilisation and inclusive direct democratic practices (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou 2013) and 
advocated the more generalised use of referenda at national and European levels (SYRIZA 
2014) while in opposition. Once in government, SYRIZA extended citizenship law to second 
generation migrants in Greece. Moving on to the symbolic dimension, in ways not dissimilar 
to inclusive populist frames elsewhere in the world, SYRIZA characterised Greek political 
and economic elites as subservient to foreign powers such as banks and multinationals, the 
Troika and its components (EC/ECB/IMF) and particularly until 2015, Germany and the 
German leadership (SYRIZA 2012: 2; 2014). SYRIZA can hence be considered a party that 
clearly leans towards inclusionary populism. 
On the contrary, the Independent Greeks can be characterised as an exclusionary 
populist party, largely by virtue of their positions - while in opposition - on the question of 
immigration. On the economic dimension, ANEL would see ‘illegal’ migration eradicated 
and quotas introduced for legal migration, defined as a percentage of the Greek population 
(ANEL 2015: 6); they have also put forward policy proposals such as the immediate 
deportation of migrants involved in illegal commercial activities (ANEL 2012: 27). In the 
political and symbolic dimensions ANEL can be considered exclusionary by virtue of their 
opposition to multi-culturalism and the close articulation of national identity, the people and 
Orthodox Christianity (ANEL 2015: 11).   
The co-habitation of an inclusionary with an exclusionary populist party in 
government (Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016) is highly unusual and has on occasion 
led to intra-governmental disagreements, with the Independent Greeks for example not 
supporting SYRIZA’s citizenship law which involved extending citizenship to second 
generation migrants (Kathimerini 2015). Nonetheless, it must be kept in mind that the Greek 
case confirms the expectation that in the aftermath of an economic crisis in Southern Europe 
it would be the inclusionary type of populism that could be expected to dominate. Indeed, 
SYRIZA’s inclusionary version of populism has been significantly more electorally 
successful (36.3 per cent) than the exclusionary version represented by the Independent 
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Greeks (4.6 per cent) and Golden Dawn (6.3 per cent) if we take the 2015 elections as a 
benchmark. That said, the expectation that exclusionary populism will also emerge where the 
cultural cleavage is activated via the immigration issue is also confirmed. 
As far as Portugal is concerned, both radical parties are close to the inclusionary type 
of populism, as both forces defend the protection of the welfare state - to reduce 
unemployment, poverty and improve the healthcare system – and the lower sectors of society. 
Both BE and PCP have always supported the expansion of social policies through an increase 
in public spending (Freire and Lisi 2016). Indeed, one of their core principles has always 
been to help improve the life conditions of weak socioeconomic groups. Finally, they both 
advocate the nationalisation of certain sectors (i.e. transports) and state control on specific 
industries, as well as the ‘democratic’ control of the bank, which is manipulated and 
controlled by foreign capitals. 
However, when we look at the political and symbolic dimensions, a qualitative 
analysis unveils some peculiarities worthy of examination. On the one hand, their populist 
discourse is based more on the fact that ‘real’ democracy was incompatible with the 
dominance of European institutions and the most powerful countries through austerity 
policies, rather than on broader political participation (as ‘inclusionary’ populism 
conventionally entails). On the other, the two forces have conceptualised the symbolic 
dimension in rather different terms. In the communist election manifestos, the term ‘people’ 
is frequently used, always as a synonymous of workers within a Marxist theoretical 
framework. The defence of sovereignty, national dignity and the people’s interests were the 
main objectives of the alternative based on a left and patriotic government (PCP 2015). By 
contrast, there are no direct references to the ‘people’ in the BE 2015 election program5. This 
left-libertarian party has come closer to the ‘new generation’ of left-wing populism – like 
SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain -, characterised by a rejection of a traditional 
Marxist interpretation if social conflicts and by the attempt to build an ‘interclassist’ 
approach. 
The analysis of the Portuguese case reveals that, although radical left parties have 
adopted an ‘inclusionary’ discourse in terms of socio-economic case, this is not an innovation 
compared to their ideological and programmatic legacy. The crisis has fostered a populist 
discourse based on the criticism towards external – i.e. European – actors and the EU 
democratic deficit. While the ideological legacy accounts for the different tones and 
arguments used by the two radical left parties, party strategy was also important in 
articulating populist arguments. 
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The qualitative analysis for the Spanish case resembles to a great extent Portuguese 
parties, at least in terms of the domestic dimension. The electoral programs of UP-IU and 
Podemos were characterised by their intense pro-redistributive proposals, their defence of 
civic and political liberties, their emphasis on democratic participation, and their opposition 
to restrictive immigration policies (Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2018; Torreblanca 2015). 
No exclusionary proposals were included in the 2015, and 2016 electoral programs of the two 
national parties adopting the most populist discourses according to holistic grading analysis. 
The electoral programs of Podemos and IU-UP emphasised the systemic association between 
political elites, large firms, and financial capital. By contrast, neither xenophobic nor anti-EU 
statements were present in the manifestos of these two political actors. The Podemos 
programs for 2015 and 2016 proposed the restructuring the Spanish debt so that banking 
institutions would pay back the loans they received from the European Stability Mechanism. 
They also proposed the overhaul of the EU stability pact and the reform of the statutes of the 
European Central Bank so that the fight against unemployment became one of its main goals 
(Podemos 2016: 134 and 136). However, they also proposed the development of a common 
EU fiscal policy and of an ambitious EU budget (Podemos 2016: 136). Podemos policy 
proposals were remarkably inclusionary in the political and symbolic domains, demanding 
the access of immigrants to full social benefits and protection. In general, our content analysis 
confirms the absence of exclusionary populism in the Spanish party system (at least at the 
national level) and the inclusionary, redistributive, and libertarian character of Podemos and 





This paper explores the use that political parties in new Southern Europe have made 
of populist discourse after the onset of the Great Recession. Our paper was based on a set of 
interrelated expectations regarding cross-temporal, cross-partisan, and cross-national 
variations in the uses of populism in Greece, Portugal and Spain. In the first place, we 
assumed that the social malaise triggered by the European crisis had led to a substantial 
increase in the presence of populist elements in party discourses. In the second place, based 
on the ideational theory on populism and previous comparative analyses, we assumed that 
populist elements would be more prevalent among ideologically extreme parties (both right 
and left) and challenger parties opposing well established political players. We also assumed 
 16 
that, given the severe social costs imposed by economic crisis and austerity policies, populist 
discourses would have a predominantly inclusionary character in the material, redistributive 
domain. However, when political-cultural issues (such as immigration or European 
integration) had been previously activated by political actors, populist discourses could also 
take a xenophobic (or nationalist) and culturally exclusionary character. Finally, as far as 
cross-national differences are concerned, we also expected that current changes would not 
definitively erase previous contrasts between Greece and the two Iberian countries regarding 
the extension of populist discourse, and that the uses of populism would continue to be more 
frequent in the former case. We have used the holistic grading of party manifestos to evaluate 
these claims empirically. 
Our expectation regarding the evolution of populism works relatively well in the case 
of Spain, moderately in the case of Portugal, and not at all in the case of Greece. In the latter 
case, levels of populism were relatively stable between 2007 and 2015. In Spain supply-side 
populism increased very substantially from 2008 to 2011 and 2015. However, weighted 
populism grew very moderately from 2008 to 2011, and then remained at a very similar level 
in the 2015 elections. In Portugal, supply-side populism experienced also a substantial 
increase from 2005 to 2009, and it maintained relatively stable levels until 2015, when its 
value was in fact substantially higher than in 2005.  
As far as the cross-partisan variations in the levels of populism are concerned, our 
data confirm the expectation that populism is associated to challenger parties, which adopt 
populist frames to criticise mainstream forces and erode their popular support. In addition, 
the use of populist rhetoric seems to be associated to party strategy, as the shifts between 
government and opposition seem to show, thus confirming our expectation. We also find that 
there is a strong association between ideological radicalism and degree of populism. Extreme 
or radical parties clearly show higher levels of populism than moderate parties, as shown by 
the +0.66 Pearson correlation between populism scores and an indicator of left-right 
radicalism based on the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017, see also Rooduijn 
et al. 2014). Our data endorse also the interpretation of populism as a discursive resource that 
can be used by groups espousing different ideologies. Now, while in Portugal and Spain there 
is also a very strong association between left-right party positions (Polk et al. 2017) and 
populism scores (Pearson correlation of -0.81 for all Iberian parties), in Greece this 
association is entirely absent. That is, while Iberian populisms have a predominantly leftist 
character, Greek populism is equally present at both extremes of the ideological spectrum. 
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As for the inclusionary-exclusionary character of populist discourses, our qualitative 
case discussions showed the prevalence of materially inclusive, redistributive proposals 
among the parties employing populist rhetoric elements. This is also reflected by the 
statistical association between populist scores and the positions of parties in the redistribution 
versus market dimension mapped in the CHES 2014 survey (Polk et al. 2017) (r=-0.56) and 
by the even stronger association between these two variables when we restrict the analysis to 
the Iberian cases (r=-0.73). This means that, in general, populist parties tend to be more pro-
redistributive, and if we focus on the Iberian Peninsula this association becomes particularly 
strong. As indicated previously, this phenomenon can be explained not only by the dramatic 
effects of the austerity policies implemented in these three countries, but also by the 
persistence of the socio-economic cleavage as the main dimension of party competition and 
the previous lack of party system responsiveness on the left-side of the political spectrum. 
However, the Greek case shows also the possibility of parties adopting explicitly 
exclusionary populist discourses in the symbolic, polity boundary dimension, a fact that can 
be connected to the greater salience of immigration, its previous politicisation in this country 
and the presence of political entrepreneurs on the right and far right (ANEL, LAOS, Golden 
Dawn) who over the course of the crisis engaged in competition over the anti-immigration 
vote (Ellinas 2013: 557).6 
Finally, our data show that despite the attenuation of cross-national differences, the 
use of populist rhetoric has remained substantially higher in Greece than in Portugal and 
Spain. This endorses the interpretation that national legacies matter, and that the previous and 
successful activation of populist styles may have created a persistent pattern or populist 
rhetoric in party competition. Despite this, strategic choices are also key for understanding 
cross-time variations, for example the fact that parties in opposition moving to government 
are prone to reduce populist rhetoric and vice versa. Overall, the findings lend support to the 
dilemma between responsible and responsive parties magisterially elaborated by Mair (2011). 
Although ideational theory goes a long way to understanding cross-country, cross-
time and cross-partisan variations, it does not explain in and of itself the success of populist 
parties. This is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon that this study cannot address. 
One interesting puzzle in this regard is the lack of party system innovation of the Portuguese 
case. Our findings show that the protest and populist component of the two radical left parties 
may have channelled voters’ dissatisfaction with mainstream parties. But there are certainly 
other factors at play, such as voters’ demobilisation (Morlino and Raniolo 2017), the lack of 
populist leaders (Marchi 2013) or the high polarisation of the party system7.  
 18 
The scope of this analysis is limited to just three South European countries. However, 
this focused comparison has both comparative and theoretical interest. On the one hand, 
empirical studies on the characteristics of populism in these countries are needed. On the 
other, this analysis can enrich our understanding of the factors conditioning the evolution and 
the substantive political content of populism in Europe after the Great Recession. Future 
research should aim to expand the empirical analysis both geographically and longitudinally, 
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Figure 1: Average levels of populism in Greece, Portugal and Spain (2005-2015) 
 
Notes: a) country average; b) weighted scores (based on electoral performance). 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Table 1: Populism scores in Greek parties (2007, 2009, 2012 and 2015 elections) 
 
Party 2007 2009 2012 (May) 2015 (Jan) 
KKE 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 
SYRIZA 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.4* 
DIMAR - - 1 - 
POTAMI - - - 0.5* 
PASOK 2 1 0.3 0.1* 
ND 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.4* 
ANEL - - 1.5 0.5* 
LAOS 1.6 1.8 - - 
GD - - 2 2 
     
Average 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.0 
Weighed average 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.9 




Table 2: Populism scores in Portuguese parties (2005-2015) 
 Party 2005 2009 2011 2015 
BE 0.25 0.7 0.5 0.4 
CDS-PP 0 0 0 0 
PCP 0.55 0.8 0.7 0.7 
PS 0 0 0.05 0.2 
PSD 0.05 0 0.05 0 
     
Average 0.17 0.3 0.26 0.27 
Weighted average 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 




Table 3: Populism scores for Spanish parties with more than 3 per cent of the national 
vote (2008, 2011, and 2015 elections).  
 
Party 2008* 2011** 2015*** 
PP 0.4 0.4 0.2 
PSOE 0 0 0.15 
Podemos   0.65 
Ciudadanos   0.15 
UP/IU 0.4 1 1.15 
    
Average 0.27 0.47 0.53 
Weighted average 0.17 0.25 0.23 
 
 
*Source: Our elaboration 
**Source: Hawkins and Castanho Silva (2016). 





                                                 
1 Both dimensions are included in Kriesi and Pappas’ work (2015). According to their indicators, Italy seems to 
diverge from new Southern European countries as it did not experience a deep economic crisis (only a political 
one). 
2 The concept of ‘challenger party’ refers to those actors that have never participated in government coalitions 
(see van der Ward et al. 2014; Hobolt and Tilley 2016). 
3 Polk et al report a +0.51 correlation between the CHES anti-elitism indicator and Rooduijn and Pauwels’s 
scores for the parties in the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. 
4 We know that in the January 2015 elections populist attitudes had a positive impact on voting for SYRIZA, 
ANEL, and the KKE (Andreadis et al. 2018), but we lack comparable empirical evidence for previous elections 
and cannot ascertain whether the electoral effects of populist attitudes changed across time. 
5 One of the few references to the people in BE’s manifestos can be found in 2011 electoral program, when it 
uses the term ‘people’ to identify the victim of the bailout negotiation (BE 2011: 29).  
 29 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 The associations between populism and the positions regarding immigration and multiculturalism are non-
existent at the Southern European level (Pearson correlations of -0.14 and -0.07 respectively), but they are 
strong for the Iberian parties (correlations of -0.73 and -0.72 respectively, populist parties being more favorable 
to immigration and multiculturalism). 
7 According to Dalton’s index, Portugal displayed higher levels of polarisation than Greece and Spain during the 







A1: Case details 
 
* Total percentage of votes lost by parties between 2000-2009 and 2009-2017 (average). 
** PSD and CDS-PP ran in the 2015 elections in the coalition called PàF (Portugal à Frente). 
 
  






Greece ANEL Government Nationalist 3.7 
 GD Opposition Extreme right 7.0 
 KKE Opposition Radical left 5.6 
 ND Opposition Conservative 28.1 
 PASOK Opposition Socialist 6.3 
 Potami Opposition Liberal 4.1 
 SYRIZA Government Radical left 35.5 
     
Portugal BE External support Radical left 10.2 
 CDS-PP** Opposition Conservative - 
 PCP External support Radical left 8.2 
 PS Government Socialist 32.3 
 PSD** Opposition Liberal 36.7 
     
Spain Ciudadanos Opposition Liberal 13.1 
 IU Opposition Radical left 2.7 
 Podemos Opposition Radical left 21.2 
 PP Government Conservative 33.0 
 PSOE Opposition Socialist 22.6 
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deficit); access to 
immigrants to full 
social benefits 
‘The people of 
this country’ (‘la 
gente de este 
país’) 





Scale for holistic grading (Source: Hawkins and Castanho e Silva; see also Hawkins et 
al. 2018. The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis, 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
0 A speech in this category uses few if any populist elements. Note that even if a 
speech expresses a Manichaean worldview, it is not considered populist if it lacks some 
notion of a popular will. 
 
1 A speech in this category includes strong, clearly populist elements but either 
does not use them consistently or tempers them by including non-populist elements. 
Thus, the discourse may have a romanticized notion of the people and the idea of a 
unified popular will (indeed, it must in order to be considered populist), but it avoids 
bellicose language or references to cosmic proportions or any particular enemy.  
 
2 A speech in this category is extremely populist and comes very close to the ideal 
populist discourse. Specifically, the speech expresses all or nearly all of the elements of 
ideal populist discourse, and has few elements that would be considered non-populist. 
 
Populist Pluralist 
It conveys a Manichaean vision of the 
world, that is, one that is moral (every 
issue has a strong moral dimension) and 
dualistic (everything is in one category or 
the other, “right” or “wrong,” “good” or 
“evil”) The implication—or even the 
stated idea—is that there can be nothing 
in between, no fence-sitting, no shades of 
grey. This leads to the use of highly 
charged, even bellicose language. 
The discourse does not frame issues in 
moral terms or paint them in black-and-
white. Instead, there is a strong tendency 
to focus on narrow, particular issues. 
The discourse will emphasize or at least 
not eliminate the possibility of natural, 




The moral significance of the items 
mentioned in the speech is heightened by 
ascribing cosmic proportions to them, 
that is, by claiming that they affect people 
everywhere (possibly but not necessarily 
across the world) and across time. 
Especially in this last regard, frequent 
references may be made to a reified 
notion of “history.” At the same time, the 
speaker will justify the moral significance 
of his or her ideas by tying them to 
national and religious leaders that are 
generally revered. 
The discourse will probably not refer to 
any reified notion of history or use any 
cosmic proportions. References to the 
spatial and temporal consequences of 
issues will be limited to the material 




Although Manichaean, the discourse is 
still democratic, in the sense that the good 
is embodied in the will of the majority, 
which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps 
Democracy is simply the calculation of 
votes. This should be respected and is 
seen as the foundation of legitimate 
government, but it is not meant to be an 
 4 
but not necessarily expressed in 
references to the “voluntad del pueblo”; 
however, the speaker ascribes a kind of 
unchanging essentialism to that will, 
rather than letting it be whatever 50 
percent of the people want at any 
particular moment. Thus, this good 
majority is romanticized, with some 
notion of the common man (urban or 
rural) seen as the embodiment of the 
national ideal. 
 
exercise in arriving at a preexisting, 
knowable “will.” The majority shifts and 
changes across issues. The common man 
is not romanticized, and the notion of 
citizenship is broad and legalistic. 
 
 
The evil is embodied in a minority whose 
specific identity will vary according to 
context. Domestically, in Latin America 
it is often an economic elite, perhaps the 
“oligarchy,” but it may also be a racial 
elite; internationally, it may be the United 
States or the capitalist, industrialized 
nations or international financiers or 
simply an ideology such as neoliberalism 
and capitalism. 
The discourse avoids a conspiratorial 
tone and does not single out any evil 
ruling minority. It avoids labeling 
opponents as evil and may not even 
mention them in an effort to maintain a 
positive tone and keep passions low. 
Crucially, the evil minority is or was 
recently in charge and subverted the 
system to its own interests, against those 
of the good majority or the people. Thus, 
systemic change is/was required, often 
expressed in terms such as “revolution” 
or “liberation” of the people from their 
“immiseration” or bondage, even if 
technically it comes about through 
elections. 
The discourse does not argue for 
systemic change but, as mentioned 
above, focuses on particular issues. In the 
words of Laclau, it is a politics of 
“differences” rather than “hegemony.” 
 
 
Because of the moral baseness of the 
threatening minority, non-democratic 
means may be openly justified or at least 
the minority’s continued enjoyment of 
these will be seen as a generous 
concession by the people; the speech 
itself may exaggerate or abuse data to 
make this point, and the language will 
show a bellicosity towards the opposition 
that is incendiary and condescending, 
lacking the decorum that one shows a 
worthy opponent. 
Formal rights and liberties are openly 
respected, and the opposition is treated 
with courtesy and as a legitimate political 
actor. The discourse will not encourage 
or justify illegal, violent actions. There 
will be great respect for institutions and 
the rule of law. If data is abused, it is 
either an innocent mistake or an 







Example I: GREECE  
 
Name of party: - Golden Dawn 
Title of Manifesto: Political Theses 
Date: 2012 
 
Final Grade (delete unused grades): 2 
 
Overall Comments (just a few sentences): The specific document is the manifesto of 
Golden Dawn. It includes a plethora of populist elements in conjunction with a 
nationalist rhetoric. 
First, the party refers to the Greeks as a collectivity, united by a common glorious past 
and a special destiny. National pride is prevalent throughout the document, as well as 
the utilization of dramaturgical elements. 
Second, the document identifies a set of ‘enemies’ for the people and relentlessly 
attacks them. These ‘enemies’ include the entire political system of Greece (after the 
collapse of the military Junta), the EU, the IMF, and foreign investors and speculators 
who conspired in order to ruin the Greek economy. 
Third, the document continuously appeals to the emotions of the voters, calling for the 
punishment of the so called ‘corrupt traitors’ and the ‘vultures of global capitalism and 
the EU’. 
Fourth, the ‘enemies’ are presented as extremely corrupt and nefarious seeking to 
enslave Greece. 
Fifth, the elections are presented as the starting point for a positive change. A break 
from the past where a new ‘Golden Dawn’ will rise in Greece, and will lead to the 
restoration of democracy, the punishment of the unjust and the liberation of the people. 
 
 
Name of party: - SYRIZA 




Final Grade (delete unused grades): 1.8 
 
Overall Comments (just a few sentences): The specific document contains a plethora 
of populist elements. First, it attacks the other parties via the utilization of a strong 
language, and with accusations of corruption. 
Second, the document includes within its identification of the ‘enemy’ the EU, the 
international banking and monetary system, and the plutocracy. 
Third, the document utilizes moral binaries and claims that the Greek people can only 
hope for a meaningful change via the Left’s rise to power. It identifies the Greeks as a 
collectivity, suffering under the corruption and the exploitation of the afore-mentioned 
enemies. The document includes all classes, and mentions how the Left has always been 
by the side of the ‘people’ through their collective struggles. 
Finally, the elections are presented within the symbolic terrain as a battle that will 
define history and change its course. The party calls all the Greek citizens to unite and 





Name of party: - New Democracy party 
Title of Manifesto:  New Democracy, a Choice of Responsibility 
Date of Speech: 2009 
 
Final Grade (delete unused grades): 0.7 
 
 
Overall Comments (just a few sentences): The specific document contains some 
populist elements, but overall the pluralist ones dominate it. 
First, the document attempts to refer to the Greek people as a collectivity, by providing 
pictures of citizens from different backgrounds and social groups, and by referencing 
them by mentioning the beneficial reforms that they have made for them (farmers, 
university students, women, small firm owners etc.). However, the document does not 
imbue the concept of ‘the people’ with any kind of supernatural quality. 
Second, the document attacks the opposition and blames them for the current state of 
the economy which can be attributed to their populist policies and the corruption found 
within the Public Sector. It does not utilize any harsh language, but it goes on to call 
them populist and irresponsible.  
Third, the document provides moral binaries between the government and the 
opposition by claiming that as opposed to them, they worked hard since the beginning 
of the crisis in order to rejuvenate the economy, and have not promised anything with 









Example II: PORTUGAL 
 
Name of party: PCP   
Title of Manifesto: Programa de ruptura, patriótico e de esquerda. Um 
compromisso com os trabalhadores, o povo e o país  
Date of election: 2009 
 
Final Grade (delete unused grades): 0.7 
 
There is a clear distinction between the ‘ruling elite’ (the main governing parties) and 
the ‘normal’ people - that is, workers – in opposition to the privileged groups. The 
minority who rules Portugal over the democratic period is considered subordinated to 
the powerful economic interests that exploit the country and the people to gain more 
power and resources. Although the PCP stresses the need for a radical change of 
policies (the ‘ruptura’ mentioned in the title of the document), the party does not aim to 
implement a completely different political system. There are some political reforms 
inspired to populist values – such as the defence of instruments of direct democracy 
(referendum, petitions, etc.) -, but the overall aim is to preserve and strengthen the 25 
april constitution. The main part of the electoral manifesto is a list of specific policies to 
be implemented. Finally, the language used throughout the document in not bellicose.  
 
 
Name of party: BE   
Title of Manifesto: PROGRAMA PARA UM GOVERNO QUE RESPONDA À 
URGÊNCIA DA CRISE SOCIAL A POLÍTICA SOCIALISTA PARA 
PORTUGAL 
Date of election: 2009 
 
Final Grade (delete unused grades): 0.8 
 
There is a strong emphasis on the ‘rich’ minority, that exploits state resources to the 
detriment of the ‘poor classes’. This Manichean distinction emerges in several domains, 
not only in economic terms, but also in policy areas such as justice or sports. However, 
the concept of the popular will is not clarified and it is not used in a systematic or 
consistent way, but it is used on an irregular basis. Finally, the Left Bloc does not 
present radical changes of the political system, but it aims to strengthen its popular 
component, thus facilitating the decision-making power of voters (for instance, through 
the use of referenda or popular legislative initiatives). 
 
 
Name of party: PS  
Title of Manifesto: Programa Eleitoral do Partido Socialista. Eleições legislativas de 
2015. Alternativa de Confiança   
Date of Manifesto: 2015 
 
Final Grade (delete unused grades): 0.2 
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Overall Comments (just a few sentences): The manifesto consists mainly in lists of 
policy proposals. It contains several critics directed to the previous government, the 






Example III:  SPAIN 
 
 
Name of party: PSOE   
Title of Manifesto:  Motivos para Creer. Programa Electoral.  
Date of manifesto: 2008 
Final grade: 0 
 
The discourse lacks populist elements whatsoever. Manichean interpretations are 
absolutely absent, pluralism and the rule of law are often mentioned and defended, and 
there are no mentions to a unified and romanticized popular will. The program does not 
advocate systemic change, but focuses on specific proposals.   
 
 
Name of party: PP 
Title of Manifesto:  Las Ideas Claras. Con Rajoy es Posible 
Date of manifesto: 2008 
Final grade: 0.4 
 
 
There are Manichean elements which tend to focus on the conflict between democracy 
and terrorism. There are strong moral and political accusations against the Socialist 
government for having negotiated with terrorists and also, more critically, with 
peripheral nationalist groups that reject the Spanish constitutional framework. Strong 
people-centred and nationalist arguments, historicist in some cases, are present. But 
rejection of terrorism and Spanish nationalism are linked to the defence of the Spanish 
constitution, of pluralism and of consensus within the bounds of the constitutional 
framework. And there are no allusions to cosmic change. Although some populist 
elements are present they are more than tempered by the defence of pluralism and 
freedoms, by the appeal to constitutional consensus, and also by the emphasis on 
specific programmatic measures instead of on cosmic or dramatic change. 
 
 
Name of party: IU 
Title of Manifesto:  Marzo 2008. Más Izquierda. Programa Electoral 
Date of manifesto: 2008 
Final grade: 0.4 
 
The discourse has populist characteristics in that the current socioeconomic system 
(capitalism) is presented as the source of most social, economic, and political problems. 
The systemic perversity of capitalism gives political struggles cosmic connotations. 
There is not, however, a highly charged moral language regarding specific enemies 
(neither the capitalist class nor the elites in general), nor an appeal to overthrow the 
prevailing socio-economic system. Analyses and proposals are based on the key role of 
the left or the “lefts” (izquierdas) as a political actor, not of a unified people. And they 
admit grey shades. For instance, the Socialist Party is criticized for its weakness vis-à-
vis the right and the established interests, but some alliances between this party and the 
IU are praised. The critique of capitalism does not lead to advocate revolutionary 
politics. By contrast, the text is full of specific proposals in the fields of economy, 
education, environment, social rights, etc. These proposals do not call for the abolition 
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of capitalism, not even for the nationalization of businesses or economic sectors. Calls 
for a new constitutional framework are made, but they are linked to the creation of new 
social consensus and to popular referenda.  
 
 
Name of party: Podemos 
Title of Manifesto:  :  Queremos, sabemos, podemos. Un programa para cambiar 
nuestro país 
Date of manifesto: 2015 
Final grade: 0.65 
 
 
The preamble of the manifesto articulates many of the elements of ideal populist 
discourse, but it also includes some non-populist elements and in particularly it 
acknowledges political pluralism. The preamble shows a romanticized notion of “la 
gente” and the idea of a unified popular will. However, the preamble avoids bellicose 
language and does not mention any particular enemy. Furthermore, most of the 
manifesto is devoted to specific and technical proposals. There are no references to 
other political parties nor to any evil minority, and proposals are framed within the legal 
and constitutional framework.  
